aggrandizement, their own glory, without regard to law or justice or faith. The issue to-day and to-morrow may seem uncertain, but the end is not uncertain. No one knows how soon the end will come, or what dreadful suffering and sacrifice may stand between; but the progress of the great world movement that has doomed autocracy cannot be turned back, or defeated.

That is the great peace movement.

There the millions who have learned under freedom to hope and aspire for better things are paying the price that the peaceful peoples of the earth may live in security under the protection of law based upon all-embracing justice and supreme in the community of nations.

The PRESIDENT. The next number on the program is "The Status of Armed Merchantmen" and the discussion upon that will be opened by Mr. Chandler P. Anderson, of the New York Bar.

THE STATUS OF ARMED MERCHANTMEN

ADDRESS BY CHANDLER P. ANDERSON

Of the New York Bar, formerly Counselor for the Department of State

The status of armed merchantmen depends primarily upon whether their armament is for aggressive or defensive purposes. The merchantman armed for attack upon commerce or upon enemy ships loses its status as a merchantman and acquires that of an auxiliary cruiser or privateer, which puts it outside of the scope of the present discussion. On the other hand, a merchantman armed solely for self-defense retains its status as a private ship, either on the high seas or in the territorial waters of a neutral, so long as it attends strictly to its legitimate business of carrying cargoes and passengers. This was the accepted rule prior to the present war and until Germany discovered that a merchantman armed for defense and retaining its status as a private ship presented an obstacle to the unrestricted use of submarines as commerce destroyers.

Under the recognized rules, which were generally observed prior to Germany's lawless use of submarines, the increased protection against capture which a belligerent merchant ship gained by arming for self-defense was gained at the sacrifice of only a small part of the limited degree of protection which the law extended to unarmed vessels. Whether armed or unarmed, a belligerent merchant ship was liable to be sunk if captured, or if trying to escape or resisting capture, but if the defensively armed ship did not resist, or if, after resisting or trying to escape, ceased to defend

herself, then, as in the case of the unarmed ship, she could be sunk only after the passengers and crew had been placed in safety. The risk of being attacked and sunk while resisting capture by using her armament in self-defense, therefore, was the only additional risk incurred by arming for defense, and this risk could be incurred or avoided in the discretion of the captain in determining whether or not the chance of escaping by resistance justified taking this additional risk. As to the cargo, the treatment which it was entitled to receive depended not upon whether the ship was armed or unarmed, but upon whether the cargo was enemy owned or neutral owned, and if neutral, whether or not it was contraband of war.

So also neutral persons and enemy noncombatants among the passengers and crew did not lose their status as neutrals and noncombatants by reason of the armament or resistance of the ship, unless they participated in its defense, and they were entitled to be placed in safety before the ship was sunk, unless the sinking was necessary to overcome resistance or prevent escape.

As to neutral ships, the only object in arming them was to enable them to defend themselves against lawlessness. Neutral ships, whether armed or unarmed, were at liberty to attempt by flight to escape, but not by force, to resist visit and search of the ship and seizure of contraband cargo. If captured after flight or resistance, they lost their neutral privileges, and the ship and cargo became subject to the same treatment as in the case of belligerent ships. If they did not resist, or attempt to escape capture, or visit and search, the legal right to sink them in any event was doubtful. Unresisting neutral merchant ships could not be sunk in any circumstances under the established rule as between Great Britain and the United States, and only in very exceptional circumstances under the rules adopted by some of the other maritime Powers, which permitted the sinking of the vessel in some cases if she was liable to seizure and condemnation, and then only after all persons on board had been placed in safety.

As between the United States and Germany, however, under our special treaty arrangements with Germany, American vessels, whether armed or unarmed, could not be detained even when carrying contraband, if the contraband part of the cargo was delivered out.

The foregoing gives a brief outline of the legal status of defensively armed merchant ships and their rights and obligations which Germany encountered in undertaking to use submarines as commerce destroyers. It remains to consider the changes which Germany sought to introduce in this situation in order to legalize the use of this novel weapon against commerce without risk to the safety of the submarine.

Soon after the outbreak of the war the Government of the United States defined and communicated to the belligerent Powers the general rules which it would follow in dealing with cases involving the status of armed merchant vessels visiting American ports; among which rules are the following:

> A merchant vessel of belligerent nationality may carry armament and ammunition for the sole purpose of defense without acquiring the character of a ship of war.

And —

> The conversion of the merchant vessel into a ship of war is a question of fact, which is to be established by direct or circumstantial evidence of intention to use the vessel as a ship of war.

The German Government promptly objected to these rules, pronouncing them unneutral because they drew a distinction between armament for defense alone and armament for aggressive purposes, whereas Germany contended that a defensively armed merchant ship should be subjected to the same treatment as a ship of war, rendering her liable to destruction without warning and relieving the enemy ship of any responsibility for placing the noncombatant passengers and crew in safety.

In answer to this contention, the Government of the United States informed the German Government that it dissented from the views expressed by that Government, and added —

> The practice of a majority of nations and the consensus of opinion by the leading authorities of international law, including many German writers, support the proposition that merchant vessels may arm for defense without losing their private character, and that they may employ such armament against hostile attack without contravening the principles of international law.

The destruction of the *Lusitania* brought the question up for discussion in its practical application to a specific case. In that case the German Government sought to justify the action of the submarine in attacking without warning, and without first placing the passengers and crew in safety, on the ground, among others, that the *Lusitania* was armed, and was under instructions from the British Admiralty to attack German submarines by ramming them. The Government of the United States replied, informing the German Government that the *Lusitania* "was not armed for offensive action," and stated that "only her actual resistance to capture or refusal to stop when ordered to do so for the purpose of visit could have afforded the commander of the submarine any justification for put-

ting the lives of those on board in jeopardy." The circumstances under which the *Lusitania* was attacked showed that she was not in a position to ram the submarine and the suggestion of that possibility as a justification was ignored in the discussion by the Government of the United States.

The Government of the United States also pointed out, in this correspondence, that submarines were disqualified for use as commerce destroyers even against unarmed and unresisting vessels, because it was practically impossible to use them for that purpose without disregarding those rules of fairness, reason, justice and humanity, which all modern opinion regards as imperative, because a submarine cannot visit a merchantman at sea and examine her papers and cargo, or make a prize of her for lack of facilities for putting a prize crew on board of her, or sink her without leaving her crew and all on board of her to the mercy of the sea in her small boats, so that manifestly submarines could not be used against merchant ships without an inevitable violation of many sacred principles of justice and humanity.

The answer of the German Government to these representations is summed up in the following extract from the German note of July 8, 1915: "If the commander of the German submarine which destroyed the *Lusitania* had caused the crew and travelers to put out in boats before firing the torpedo this would have meant the sure destruction of his own vessel."

The alternative of letting the vessel escape when she could not be sunk without violating the law was never seriously considered by the German Government.

The position taken by the German Government, as disclosed by the views expressed in its diplomatic communications on this subject, was that the submarine is a novel weapon of warfare against commerce, which has not yet been regulated by international law, and that the hitherto recognized rules regulating the operations of commerce destroyers do not apply to the submarine if they cannot be observed without risk to its safety. The particular application of this attitude with reference to armed merchant ships seems to be that a merchant ship armed for defensive purposes is just as dangerous to a submarine as one armed for aggressive purposes, because of the vulnerability of the submarine. Therefore, so far as submarines are concerned, all distinction between defensive and aggressive armament is wiped out, and submarines may treat all armed ships as auxiliary cruisers and sink them on sight.

The same method of reasoning would make the risk incurred by a submarine in finding out if a merchant ship is armed a sufficient justification for assuming that all merchant ships are armed, and therefore, as above stated, liable to destruction on sight as auxiliary cruisers.

So, also, it would follow that because a submarine cannot visit and search a merchant ship without running the risk of being destroyed by ramming, or by gun fire if the ship is armed, the submarine is free from any obligation to visit and search the ship, and the hitherto universally recognized rule requiring that the passengers and crew of an unresisting merchant ship must be placed in safety before the ship is sunk would not apply to submarine operations, because the passengers cannot even be given sufficient warning to permit them to get into the life boats without risk to the safety of the submarine.

By the same process of reasoning Germany seems to have reached the conclusion that it was lawful to destroy a neutral merchant ship if there was any possibility that it might be an enemy ship, and the act could be justified on the ground of mistake and by the payment of compensation. The argument seems to be that because it is sometimes impossible to distinguish a neutral from an enemy ship without visit and search, and because visit and search is dangerous if the ship proves to be an enemy, therefore, in case of doubt, a merchant ship may be assumed to be an enemy ship and sunk on sight.

This inverted process of reasoning, with its false premises put forward as a justification for lawlessness, falls to pieces when tested by the simple proposition that submarines must be inherently unfit for use as commerce destroyers if they cannot be used without violating practically all the rules of law and humanity which all nations have hitherto enforced for the protection of neutral and noncombatant passengers and crew on merchant ships. The Government of the United States took this view at the outset and finally insisted upon it in the end, although while the *Lusitania* discussion was pending an attempt was made to avoid the issue by proposing a compromise basis of settlement.

This proposal was made informally and unofficially to the Allied Powers in January, 1916, on the humane ground that it was greatly desired to put an end, if possible, to the dangers to life attending the use of submarines as employed by Germany in destroying enemy commerce. The view expressed on the part of the United States was that although the use of submarines, as employed by Germany as commerce destroyers, was contrary to those humane principles which should control belligerents in their naval operations, and was attended by an appalling loss of life among noncombatants, regardless of age or sex, a belligerent should not be wholly deprived of the use of submarines as commerce destroyers. With the expressed purpose, therefore, of bringing submarine warfare within the general rules of international law and the principles of humanity, without

destroying its efficiency in the destruction of commerce, it was suggested that a formula might be found, which, although modifying the practice generally followed by nations prior to the employment of submarines, would appeal to the sense of justice and fairness of all the belligerents in the present war. The following formula was proposed:

> If a submarine is required to stop and search a merchant vessel on the high seas and, in case it is found that she is of enemy character and that conditions necessitate her destruction, to remove to a place of safety all persons on board, it would not seem just or unreasonable that the submarine should be compelled, while complying with these requirements, to expose itself to almost certain destruction by the guns on board the merchant vessel.
>
> It would, therefore, appear to be a reasonable and reciprocally just arrangement if it could be agreed by the opposing belligerents that submarines should be caused to adhere strictly to the rules of international law in the matter of stopping and searching merchant vessels, determining their belligerent nationality and removing the crews and passengers to places of safety, before sinking the vessels as prizes of war, and that merchant vessels of belligerent nationality should be prohibited and prevented from carrying any armament whatsoever.

It does not appear from this communication how the arrangement thus proposed was expected to obviate the objection previously pointed out to the use of submarines as commerce destroyers, because of their inherent incapacity to protect the lives of passengers and crew by placing them in safety before destroying the vessel, assuming that placing them in small boats in the open sea is not placing them in safety, which was the position previously taken by the United States Government in the *Lusitania* and *William P. Frye* correspondence. This question did not arise for discussion, however, because the Allied Powers refused for other reasons to entertain this suggestion, which was not further urged.

The Government of the United States then formulated and communicated to the belligerent Powers a memorandum setting forth a series of propositions defining its views as to the status of armed merchant vessels and their relations to belligerents and neutrals, among which propositions the following are of special interest in connection with the present discussion:

> The status of such [an armed merchant] vessel as a warship on the high seas must be determined only upon conclusive evidence of aggressive purpose, in the absence of which it is to be presumed that the vessel has a private and peaceable character, and it should be so treated by an enemy warship.
>
> . . . . . .

A belligerent should proceed on the presumption that the vessel is armed for protection.

. . . . . .

A merchantman entitled to exercise the right of self-protection may do so when certain of attack by an enemy warship, otherwise the exercise of the right would be so restricted as to render it ineffectual.

It will be observed that Germany's contention is absolutely inconsistent with these propositions. In a subsequent paragraph, however, the statement is made that merchant ships armed and under orders to attack in all circumstances certain classes of enemy naval vessels for the purpose of destroying them, lose their status as peaceable merchant ships and are to a limited extent incorporated in the naval forces of their government. Superficially this statement might be misunderstood to be an admission that a defensively armed merchant ship, if ordered to attack an enemy submarine on sight, would lose its status as a merchant ship. But, if so, what was the status of our own merchant ships during the period of so-called armed neutrality when they were armed for the purpose of defending themselves by attacking any submarine which they were certain was about to attack them?

It is quite clear from a careful examination of the above statement in relation to its context, and to the previous and subsequent position of the United States on this question, that it cannot fairly be interpreted as sustaining Germany's contention.

In the first place there is a clear distinction to be drawn between attacking a vessel operating lawfully, and attacking one operating unlawfully. The attack in the one case is an act of aggression, and in the other an act of self-defense. Attention is called to the position taken by the United States in the *Lusitania* correspondence that, to justify sinking a vessel for refusal to stop when ordered to do so, the order to stop must be "for the purpose of visit." In other words, the vessel is subject to a penalty only for refusing to submit to a lawful demand, and is under no obligation to obey an order to stop if it is given for the unlawful purpose of destroying the vessel without first placing the passengers and crew in safety. It is obvious that without this distinction the refusal of a vessel to submit to an unlawful act would amount to a justification of that act. It follows, therefore, that Germany's warning that all merchantmen, including neutrals, would be attacked by submarines on sight, made all German submarines outlaws, against which merchantmen were entitled to exercise the right of self-defense, and as that right would be ineffectual unless exercised

by attacking them first, such attack would not shift the responsibility for the unlawful act from the submarine to the innocent vessel, and would not deprive it of its status of a peaceable merchant ship.

In the second place, any other interpretation of this statement would be wholly inconsistent with the position maintained by the United States in all of its official correspondence during the war, and in authorizing the defensive armament of its own merchant ships prior to its entry into the war, which position is, as stated in the *Sussex* correspondence, that

> the use of submarines for the destruction of an enemy's commerce, is, of necessity, because of the very character of the vessels employed and the very methods of attack which their employment of course involves, utterly incompatible with the principles of humanity, the long established and incontrovertible rights of neutrals and the sacred immunities of noncombatants.

In conclusion, therefore, it can be said that the position of the Allied Powers, including the United States, has been, throughout this war, and still is, that submarines when used as commerce destroyers in the manner employed by Germany are outlaws, and that merchant ships may attack them on sight in self-defense without losing their status as peaceable vessels.

It may be that after this war is over some formula will be worked out and established by the general consent of nations, which will justify the conditional use of submarines as commerce destroyers. But that is a question for the future. If destructiveness, or mere effectiveness, is to be adopted as the test, the sacred immunity of noncombatants must be sacrificed.

It may be argued that effectiveness demands the conscription of the entire population of a belligerent nation into an organized force for war purposes, eliminating the old distinction between combatants and noncombatants, and that with the disappearance of this distinction the present immunity of noncombatant passengers and crews of merchant ships also disappears, together with the distinction between public and private ships and every other distinction and rule designed to limit the destructiveness of war by limiting its application to the actual fighting forces.

The question for the nations to decide, therefore, will be whether or not a mode of warfare shall be sanctioned which threatens to destroy those standards and rules to which all nations have hitherto subscribed, establishing some degree of security and immunity for noncombatants and private property and private vessels, which measures the advance achieved

by civilization through centuries of effort to hold in check the ruthless destructiveness of war.

The PRESIDENT. Professor Ellery C. Stowell, of Columbia University, will continue.

THE STATUS OF ARMED MERCHANTMEN

ADDRESS BY ELLERY C. STOWELL,

Associate Professor of International Law in Columbia University, New York City

Professor STOWELL. I shall not attempt to cover the same ground —

[At this point the orchestra played the National Anthem, and the entire assemblage arose.]

The PRESIDENT. This seems a delightful incursion.

Professor STOWELL. That seemed almost the only fitting accompaniment for not what I shall say, but the thought which is back of what I wish to say, before I begin to discuss this question. It seems to me that this meeting is sanctified beyond all other meetings for the discussion of international law. The great epoch-making address of President Wilson set forth the fundamental principle of international law as it had never been set forth before. Great authorities, Westlake and others, had set it forth, but they were not speaking as a government.

Several times during the war President Wilson has spoken that same thought, but this time it was both spoken and acted upon, and from that moment the league of nations for the enforcement of international law existed, and international law acquired the sanction to which it had a right — the sanction which all societies of peoples must have wherever there be a law.

I shall not attempt to go over the ground covered by Mr. Anderson, who so ably discussed this question. It makes it much easier to take up certain other points to which I should like to call attention.

The question of armed merchantmen is one of the most difficult the world has ever known, and yet, if you separate it into its different elements, resolve it into the several parts of which it is composed, it becomes really very simple. The great difficulty is that this separation is not usually made, and I believe that certain diplomatic difficulties have resulted from a very natural effort to economize time and effort, and to combine several questions into one. For instance, the distinction between merchantmen armed for defense and merchantmen armed for aggression is really, it

seems to me, an attempt to solve at the same time the question of the right to resist and the conversion of merchantmen into warships.

The first question involved in the matter of the status of armed merchantmen is that of access to neutral ports. Now, it is well known that warships are not admitted to neutral ports except for a very short period, and are limited in the amount of coal and provisions they may receive; and so it becomes very important to know whether an armed merchantman is to be treated as an ordinary merchant vessel and be allowed to stay in port as long as it chooses, and take on as much provision as it chooses, or as a warship, with all the restrictions imposed upon warships.

At the outbreak of the war there were a great many German liners in the ports of this country, and this Government was immediately notified by the British Government that it would be held responsible if it allowed these liners, which might be converted into cruisers on the high seas, to leave the American ports. That question seemed a very troublesome one, and when we consider the difficulties we had in the *Alabama* case and how much indemnity England eventually had to pay us for the damage the *Alabama* did to our commerce, it was very natural that our Government should be very wary of incurring responsibility. But, really, that question is the simplest of them all. Every nation may make its own regulations as to the stay of war vessels in its ports, and, strictly speaking, it might perhaps define the vessels that it considered warships. Such a statement, however, would not pass without opposition. But a nation must not change its regulations in the course of war, unless the change be required by some very great national need.

The next question involved is the right of neutrals to travel on armed merchantmen. That has been very much discussed in this country, and there has been a great deal of talk at random. Of course, from an international point of view, neutrals have the right to travel on armed merchantmen. If this Government or any other Government should desire to prohibit its own citizens from traveling on the ships of any other country, it might do so, but that would not affect the international question.

The important question is, What is the measure of protection of neutrals traveling on armed belligerent liners? By some authorities it is said that the measure of protection to be accorded to neutrals traveling on armed merchant vessels — liners in this case — is the same as the measure of protection of belligerent noncombatants. In other words, if a belligerent has a right to sink an enemy vessel or to do certain acts to the noncombatants on board that vessel, neutrals on such vessels under the enemy's flag may be subjected to the same treatment. If that is accepted, then we

can pass over the question of the protection of neutrals traveling on armed liners and settle it when we discuss the rights of noncombatants in general on belligerent armed liners.

But I am not willing to let that assertion pass without objection. It seems to me that the rights of neutrals traveling on the armed liners of a belligerent are not quite the same as the rights of belligerent noncombatants. In other words, Americans traveling on British liners before the entry of America into the war, I think, were in a different position from the British citizens on that liner not engaged in the war, and the reason I think this is that the international communications which were maintained by those liners were a right of this nation as a neutral.

If the other belligerent — Germany in this case — wished to have recourse to reprisals against Great Britain, she might bring her reprisals to bear on the British passengers in return for alleged acts against German civilians or some other act which might justify reprisals, but I think she had no right to involve neutrals traveling on the high seas. Such travel is a neutral right, and it may not be brought within the scope of belligerent reprisals.

Coming, now, to the question of the rights of noncombatants on belligerent armed vessels. This question may be divided from the historical point of view into two periods, the situation before the Declaration of Paris, when privateers existed, and the situation which has existed since the Declaration. In the day of privateers a different situation existed because the privateer was a privately-owned vessel that acted as a commerce raiding warship for private gain. I do not wish to take up that phase of the subject, interesting as it is, because of the limit of time, but I wish to take up the situation after the Declaration of Paris.

If we examine that great Declaration, we find its general purpose was to benefit neutrals. But Great Britain, I think we may fairly say, accepted the Declaration of Paris and agreed to be bound by its provisions; in other words, agreed to the codification of neutrality, which she had never willingly agreed to before, because she wished formerly to keep the law liquid, so she might modify it, perhaps, to suit the situation. She accepted the Declaration in return for the doing away with privateering. The United States was not willing to give up the right of privateering unless the Powers went one step further and secured the immunity of private property at sea. So we see the United States did not at that time agree to abolish this right of private warfare. It is true that we have observed this Declaration, and I am willing to admit — I do not think it is generally controverted — that the lapse of time and general acceptance have made the Declaration of Paris international law.

But what we have to examine very carefully is what was the real meaning of this abolition of privateering. I am not taking here a technical attitude. I am trying to take up the questions upon which I have heard the bitterest altercations and not spend time on the questions which the defendants of the other view accept. The effect of the Declaration of Paris as abolishing the right of privateering has been made the basis of the contention of those outside of Germany who defend certain of the German views in regard to the status of armed merchantmen.

As I said, the characteristic of the privateer is private command and private gain. The auxiliary fleets of the present day and armed merchantmen bear absolutely no analogy, and they could not, by any stretch of the imagination, be included among the privateers that were supposed to be done away with and were done away with by the Declaration of Paris. I do not think we need any better proof of that than the interesting case which occurred in 1870, during the Franco-German War, when the Prussian Government wished to fit out certain auxiliary vessels, and France protested that that was a violation of this provision of the Declaration of Paris prohibiting privateering. It was the British law officers themselves who examined the question and found that there was a difference between this fitting out of merchant vessels with officers of the Prussian Navy, and the privateers which were covered by the first article of the Declaration of Paris.

There are other reasons still more fundamental, I think, why merchantmen have the right to defend themselves. It is the most fundamental right we can think of for a man to defend his property unless somebody with authority comes to take it from him. A merchantman sailing the seas has a right to defend his property unless somebody under authority comes to take it from him. Certainly the enemy are not coming with authority to take it from him unless by international law they have been given that right; but to the present day that right has never been given.

There is a further right of self-preservation, mentioned by Mr. Anderson, since if the merchantmen do not defend themselves their passengers and crew will be put in small boats when the submarine sinks the vessel. This brings me to another question which I think has not been sufficiently considered. The international law of the sea grew up at a time when there was almost no passenger travel, and there has been no war in which the passenger travel has been involved in the way this war has affected it. If submarines had taken all the passengers off of the vessels which they sank, and taken them on board, they would then have been complying technically with international law, but subjecting the passengers to the very great danger, while they continued their cruise of being sunk. Such a

treatment is intolerable when imposed upon innocent noncombatants. I should like to go deeper in that question, but the time will not permit.

In closing, I would say that this whole question of the right of defense of armed merchantmen goes again to the very vitals of the difference between the German idea and the idea of the other countries. The German idea has been to have a specialized force developed in fighting, and the other Powers want to preserve the rights, as far as possible, of civilians to make the necessary defense, so as to lessen the charges and the military burdens.

The PRESIDENT. The subject of "The Status of Armed Merchantmen" is now open for discussion from the floor. Any member of the Society who has any views to express upon that will be heard with appreciation.

Mr. MAURICE LEON. The first speaker who was heard to-night on this subject referred to the faulty reasoning of various German contentions which had gradually brought the German Government to the point of claiming the right to sink every vessel of whatsoever kind, belligerent or neutral; to destroy all lives, whether those of belligerent noncombatants or neutrals. This idea of faulty reasoning has been brought to the fore in many discussions, and I would say that our jails are full of people who have shown faulty reasoning along similar lines.

Now, when you come right down to it — and when you go to the heart of it — what do you find? You find that in the case of the use of the submarine, as in the case of the use of all other war vessels employed in destroying belligerent commerce, there are certain risks. These risks are greater or lesser according to whether the vessel employed is stronger or weaker. A submarine is indeed a fragile vessel, but so is a torpedo boat. It is conceded that a surface torpedo boat might be sunk by a shell of just about the same size as would sink a submarine, and on that account in past wars the use of surface torpedo boats was seldom if ever resorted to against armed merchantmen.

Here a great deal of argument is put forth in behalf of the vulnerability of a vessel, truly vulnerable, somewhat more or somewhat less than others, but whoever heard before this war that, in order to avoid a risk which is necessarily inherent in warfare, acts of barbarism may be perpetrated; and it comes right down to this, quite apart from any faulty reasoning, that we find a navy in this war composed of men who, in order to avoid those risks which were ever necessarily inherent in warfare, have done the things which we all know about. So, I submit to you, the reasoning is faulty, and it might even be called vicious, and the instinct back

of it is a very low and base one. It is not the instinct which was felt by the men who, at very great risk, enforced, for example, the blockade which saved this Union; it is not the instinct which has usually prevailed among sailors of the navies of self-respecting nations. It is a faulty reasoning and an instinct which must be extirpated, and fortunate it is that we are at last about to do our share to that end.

The PRESIDENT. Are there any other remarks to be made on this subject?

(No response.)

The PRESIDENT. If not, the meeting will stand adjourned until ten o'clock to-morrow morning, at this place.

(Whereupon, at ten o'clock P.M., the meeting adjourned to meet to-morrow morning at ten o'clock at the same place.)